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The study of psychological problems in schizophrenia has 
traditionally focused on basic cognitive processes, such as 
attention, memory and other executive functions. It was not until 
the 1990s that researchers began to take an interest in studying 
social dysfunction and its impact on the daily life of people who 
suffer from this illness. Several studies (Corrigan & Penn, 2001; 
Couture, Roberts, & Penn, 2006) already indicate the diffi culties 
patients with schizophrenia face in terms of social interaction, 
their ability to live independently, hygiene and personal care, and 
their effectiveness at resolving common social problems. These 
contributions signify a new direction in the study of psychological 
impairment in schizophrenia, and they demonstrate the progression 
from a viewpoint that was excessively focused on basic 
neurocognitive impairments to a wider perspective in which the 
social limitations of patients take on a signifi cant role. It should be 
mentioned that when the consequences of neurocognitive defi cits 
in the social functioning of schizophrenia patients were assessed 
(Green, Kern, Braff, & Mintz, 2000), the data revealed that they 
only explain between 20 and 60% of the variance found, leaving the 
accompanying range (40-80%) without explanation. These results 
suggest that, in addition to the domain of basic psychological 
processes, there is a mediating psychological domain related to 
social-cognitive aspects that would account for at least part of the 
unexplained variance. This explanatory gap establishes the social 
functioning of people with schizophrenia as a key to understanding 
their overall cognitive functioning. 
Within the realm of social cognition, a discipline that studies the 
psychological processes involved in handling social information, 
research into schizophrenia has placed an emphasis on emotion 
perception, social cognition, attributional style and theory of 
mind (ToM). This article intends to focus on studies that explore 
anomalies in the ToM capacity of schizophrenia patients, selecting 
fundamental aspects of Frith’s meta-representational defi cit theory 
 ISSN 0214 - 9915 CODEN PSOTEG
Copyright © 2013 Psicothema
www.psicothema.com
Theory of mind and language comprehension in schizophrenia
José M. Gavilán Ibáñez and José E. García-Albea Ristol
Research Center for Behavior Assessment (CRAMC), Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Abstract Resumen
Background: Theory of mind (ToM) is the natural ability to attribute/infer 
mental states about ourselves and others. The study of the limits of this 
capacity in autism-spectrum disorders has been projected more recently 
to the case of schizophrenia. Method: We review the studies on ToM 
defi ciency in schizophrenia, based on the link observed by Chris Frith 
between psychotic symptoms and mentalizing anomalies, with particular 
attention to the implications of ToM in linguistic communication in the 
fi eld of fi gurative language comprehension. Results: The data support a 
connection between ToM defi cits and psychotic symptoms. In schizophrenia, 
the defi cit in ToM appears to be specifi c and not dependent on more general 
cognitive abilities, and according to the evidence examined, it resembles 
a trait more than a state condition. The analysis of results shows that 
anomalies in ToM have projections on pragmatic aspects of language 
comprehension. Conclusions: ToM defi cits showed by schizophrenic 
patients are especially linked to diffi culties in understanding fi gurative 
language, beyond the infl uence of intelligence and executive functions.
Keywords: schizophrenia, theory of mind, language comprehension, 
executive functions.
Teoría de la mente y comprensión del lenguaje en la esquizofrenia. 
Antecedentes: la teoría de la mente (TM) es la capacidad natural que nos 
permite atribuir/inferir estados mentales respecto de nosotros mismos y de 
los demás. El estudio de los límites de dicha capacidad en los trastornos 
de espectro autista se ha proyectado más recientemente al caso de la 
esquizofrenia. Método: se revisan los estudios sobre el défi cit de TM en 
la esquizofrenia partiendo del vínculo establecido por Chris Frith entre 
sintomatología psicótica y anomalías mentalistas, prestando especial 
atención a las implicaciones de la TM en la comunicación lingüística en 
el ámbito de la comprensión del lenguaje fi gurado. Resultados: los datos 
apoyan una conexión entre défi cits mentalistas y síntomas psicóticos. En la 
esquizofrenia el défi cit en TM se ha mostrado específi co y no dependiente 
de capacidades cognitivas más generales y, por la evidencia examinada, 
parece que se asemeja más a una condición de rasgo que de estado. Los 
resultados analizados muestran que las anomalías mentalistas se proyectan 
en los aspectos pragmáticos de la comprensión del lenguaje. Conclusiones: 
los défi cits en TM que muestran los pacientes con esquizofrenia están 
especialmente ligados a difi cultades en la comprensión del lenguaje 
fi gurado, más allá de la infl uencia de la inteligencia y las funciones 
ejecutivas.
Palabras clave: esquizofrenia, teoría de la mente, comprensión del len-
guaje, funciones ejecutivas.
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as a point of departure for the study of mentalizing anomalies in 
schizophrenia. Relevant works that research the specifi c nature of 
ToM defi cit in this type of patient will be reviewed in this context, 
as will the question of whether or not this defi cit corresponds to a 
state or trait of the illness. After that, we will focus on the studies 
that connect mentalizing defi cits with anomalies in the pragmatic 
aspects of language comprehension (LC), and last section provides 
a short summary of the article as a conclusion. 
Theory of mind and meta-representational defi cit in schizophrenia
ToM has been defi ned as the natural capacity to attribute/
infer mental states in order to explain and predict behaviour in 
situations that involve social interaction (Baron-Cohen, Tager-
Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993). The term was originally coined by 
primatologists Premack and Wooodruff (1978) to suggest the 
possibility that chimpanzees are capable of inferring the mental 
states of humans and members of their own species. Subsequently, 
a considerable number of developmental psychologists adopted 
the term to describe the ontogenetic development of the capacity 
to pretend or simulate (fi ctional games) in babies and children at 
a developmental age (Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991). In the area of 
schizophrenia, Chris Frith and colleagues (Corcoran, Mercer, & 
Frith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) began the empirical study 
of ToM defi cit in the mid 1990s. The same author theorized in an 
earlier 1991 publication in collaboration with his wife (Frith & 
Frith, 1991) that autism and schizophrenia could share a common 
defi cit, one in which ToM or, in their terms, the mechanism used 
to generate meta-representations, is severely compromised. This 
idea stems from the observation that the negative signs that appear 
in schizophrenia (social isolation, poor communication, absence 
of creative/spontaneous behaviour and stereotyped behaviour) 
are similar to Wing’s triad (Wing & Gould, 1979) characterizing 
autism (socialization, communication and imagination disorders). 
Chris and Uta Frith suggest that, unlike autism, in which ToM 
anomalies are congenital, in schizophrenia, the impaired capacity 
for mentalizing usually appears in adulthood and is generally 
associated with the fi rst psychotic episode, when all cognitive and 
linguistic capacities have already been fully developed. In their 
opinion, this difference could explain why these two pathologies 
show clearly differentiated symptomatologies. In fact, characteristic 
signs of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations and delusions, do not 
usually appear in autism, whereas in the latter illness, it is common 
to fi nd islands of ability that are rarely seen in schizophrenia. 
In what is probably his most referenced work, Frith (1992) 
develops the theory that the fundamental disorder suffered by 
patients with schizophrenia is a defi ciency in being aware of 
oneself and being aware of others. In short, Frith suggests that, 
in schizophrenia, there is an underlying refl ective awareness 
disorder, in other words, a disorder in the capacity to think 
about one’s own thoughts and about those of other people. In 
his opinion, patients with schizophrenia present a dysfunction in 
the psychological mechanism that makes it possible to generate 
meta-representations about mental states, that is, representations 
of intentional attitudes. 
The link Frith makes between awareness and the meta-
representational mechanism is worthy of critical analysis, as is his 
insistence on attributing the cognitive anomalies of schizophrenia 
to the mentalizing defi cit alone. In the fi rst instance, it does not 
seem justifi ed to state that awareness is essential for the mechanism 
to fail, while in the second, he is perhaps guilty of reductionism 
when he causally reduces the heterogeneity of defi cits observed 
in schizophrenia to one sole mechanism, however fundamental it 
may be. In any case, his proposals can be used to contextualize 
early research into ToM in schizophrenia, and it is on the basis of 
his fi rst works (Frith, 1987, 1992, 1994) that Frith establishes a 
tentative connection between schizophrenia, refl ective awareness 
and meta-representation. Using this connection as a point of 
departure, he develops the theory that the signs and symptoms seen 
in schizophrenia patients are the expression of the absence of, or a 
dysfunction in, the mechanism used to process meta-representations. 
According to this theory, psychotic symptomatology can be 
explained in terms of variable degrees of severity or impairment 
in the capacity to think about (or be aware of) one’s own thoughts 
and those of other people (see Table 1).
Frith (1992) distinguishes between the signs and symptoms of 
schizophrenia. The former refer to the observable behaviour of 
patients and the latter to the internal experience (non-observable) 
inherent to suffering from this illness. His model makes 
predictions about how patients with schizophrenia should behave 
in ToM assessment tasks. Specifi cally, both patients with negative 
behavioural signs (avolition, poverty of speech, social isolation, 
fl at affect) and positive behavioural signs (incoherent thoughts, 
disorganized behaviour) should achieve very low scores in ToM 
tasks, showing a defi cit similar to that of the autism spectrum 
disorder, due to their prevailing diffi culty in representing aims and 
intentions (their own and those of others). Frith also predicts that 
patients with symptoms of paranoia (delusions of self-reference, 
delusions of persecution, and conspiracy) will fi nd it diffi cult to 
resolve mentalizing tasks, because even though they can interpret 
the intentions of others, they commit attributional/inferential errors 
that lead to a mistaken interpretation. In his opinion, patients with 
passivity symptoms (thought insertion/theft, delusions of control) 
should not be differentiated from patients in remission or control 
subjects, because although they fi nd it diffi cult to represent their 
own mental states, they have no problem in representing the mental 
states of others.
The fi rst experimental studies carried out by Frith and colleagues 
(Corcoran et al., 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran & Frith, 
1996) widely confi rmed the predictions of the model, although 
it has not been possible to reproduce some of the results since. 
Frith found very severe diffi culties in patients with behavioural 
signs (negative and positive) and less severe problems in patients 
with paranoid symptoms and passivity symptoms. The connection 
between paranoid symptoms and ToM defi cits discovered by 
Frith’s team could not be corroborated by later studies (Langdon et 
al., 2001; Mazza et al., 2001).
Table 1
Anomalies in awareness of intention associated with psychotic signs and 
symptoms. From C. D. Frith (1994)
Loss of 
awareness of…
Positive features Negative features
Own goals Grandiose ability Depersonalization, lack of will 
Own intentions Delusions of control, thought 
insertion
Poverty of thought, loss of 
affect
Others’ intentions Delusions of persecution, 
third-person hallucinations
Derealisation, social 
withdrawal
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While attributing psychotic symptomatology to ToM defi cits, 
Frith also suggested a connection between mentalizing capacity, 
symptomatology and diffi culties with the pragmatic use of 
language. Frith proposed that mentalizing defi cits or meta-
representational problems are connected to the type of symptoms 
that develop in a patient with schizophrenia. In turn, he connected 
theory of mind defi cits in schizophrenia to problems with language 
use, by which he meant the pragmatic aspects of language and 
not linguistic capacity itself. Together, Frith’s hypotheses gave a 
new focus to the cognitive problems that had traditionally been 
observed in schizophrenia patients and led to a prolifi c line of 
research into this area.
Specifi c defi cit or derived from general abilities?
It could be said in general terms that, beyond nosologic 
differences, a considerable number of studies have revealed 
defi cits associated with the mentalizing capacity of patients with 
schizophrenia (Corcoran et al., 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; 
Corcoran, Cahill, & Frith, 1997; Langdon et al., 1997, 2001, 2002; 
Mazza et al., 2001; Brüne, 2003; Couture et al., 2008; Bora et 
al., 2008). This discovery is consistent throughout these studies, 
despite the diversity of the researchers’ hypotheses and aims, and 
heterogeneity when grouping patients by symptomatology. 
One of the most sought-after goals when studying ToM in 
schizophrenia has been to confi rm whether the mentalizing 
defi cit seen in patients is specifi c, or whether it is secondary 
and dependent on other more general cognitive abilities, such as 
intelligence and/or executive functions. This idea was borrowed 
from the modular concept of ToM proposed and supported by 
autism spectrum disorders. One of the pioneering works in the 
study of the relationship between mentalizing defi cit and general 
cognitive capacity was carried out by Fine and colleagues in 2001. 
They studied a patient with very early or congenital damage to the 
left side of the amygdala who, in adulthood, was fi rst diagnosed 
with schizophrenia and then with Asperger’s syndrome. In the 
fi rst stage of cognitive assessment, the study determined that 
the patient (B.M.) had severely impaired ToM capacity. In the 
second stage, the researchers assessed B.M.’s executive capacity. 
The patient underwent various neurocognitive tests and it was 
found that he had normal intelligence (IQ= 103) and did not 
suffer from executive dysfunction. The main conclusion of the 
study is interesting because it revealed that ToM is not simply an 
aspect of more general executive functioning, and that executive 
functions can develop and function independently from ToM. The 
diffi culty in confi rming the patient’s diagnosis was likely due to 
the dissociation of capacities observed.
Langdon and colleagues were interested in the specifi c nature 
of ToM defi cit in patients with schizophrenia. A 2001 article 
(Langdon et al., 2001) reviewed the degree to which mentalizing 
defi cits can be explained by executive planning defi cits or defi cits 
in inhibiting salient information. Patients in the study presented 
ToM, executive planning and inhibition defi cits. However, the 
authors confi rmed that mentalizing defi cits continued predicting 
the probability of subjects to belong to the patient group, when 
planning and inhibition were controlled statistically. The study 
concluded that ToM in schizophrenia is impaired in specifi c terms, 
although it co-occurs with planning defi cits.
In general, research that has aimed to clarify the specifi c v. 
general defi cit debate suggests that, regardless of the tasks used, 
mentalizing anomalies are domain specifi c and not the result of 
general cognitive defi cits, though this specifi c nature does not have 
the same magnitude as that found in autism (Corcoran, 2000). 
Although these results are considerably consistent, it cannot be 
concluded that intelligence or executive functioning are not needed 
to perform mentalizing tasks, rather that once their infl uence 
is removed from the ToM defi cit-schizophrenia relationship, 
the correlation between these variables remained statistically 
signifi cant. Therefore, taking into consideration the specifi c nature 
of mentalizing defi cit in schizophrenia, it can be confi rmed that 
general cognitive ability is necessary, but not suffi cient, for patients 
to be able to infer/attribute mental states suitably. 
The state or trait controversy
Another aspect that has been of great interest to researchers 
is the degree to which mentalizing defi cits in schizophrenia can 
be considered to be a trait associated with the illness or a state 
dependent on symptomatic exacerbation. Although some data 
support the notion that ToM defi cits are heightened in acute phases 
of the illness, several lines of research have yielded evidence 
suggesting that the defi cit is a trait. On one hand, research shows 
that schizophrenic patients in remission perform signifi cantly 
worse in ToM tasks than their close family members and control 
subjects (Herold et al., 2002; Janssen, Krabbendam, & Jolles, 
2003). On the other hand, there are studies, based on continuity 
models between schizotypy and schizophrenia (Eysenck, 1960; 
Crow, 1990), that have found a signifi cant relationship between 
mentalizing anomalies and subclinical schizotypy traits (Langdon 
& Coltheart, 2004; Meyer & Shean, 2006), which seems to indicate 
that ToM impairment is not restricted to the acute phases of the 
illness. Finally, further studies have found a clear relationship 
between ToM defi ciencies and the chronic nature, or years of 
duration, of the illness (Harrington et al., 2005). Two recent meta-
analyses (Sprong et al., 2007; Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009) also 
showed that patients in remission had signifi cant mentalizing 
anomalies in comparison with the control groups assessed. Despite 
the fact that Frith’s initial work as well as some more recent studies 
(Pousa et al., 2008) lead to the conclusion that mentalizing defi cits 
are best identifi ed with a state dependent on the intensity and 
quality of psychotic symptoms, the review of studies on patients 
in remission, patients at risk of suffering from the illness and 
close family members seems to consistently relate mentalizing 
impairment with the characteristics of a variable trait. 
ToM and LC in schizophrenia
The past decade has seen growing interest in understanding 
how different impaired mentalizing capacities are interrelated in 
patients with schizophrenia. Linguistic ability, and particularly its 
semantic-pragmatic aspects, has been on researchers’ agendas from 
the time when schizophrenic disorder was fi rst defi ned. Studies on 
linguistic ability have benefi ted from the recent boom in linguistics 
and psycholinguistics, and although these disciplines have focused 
on problems from different theoretical bases and heterogeneous 
methodologies, they have provided a theoretical solidity that has 
made it possible to reach decisive conclusions in the study of 
language in schizophrenia. One of the conclusions that will be 
addressed in this review states that, in their most basic aspects, 
linguistic structures do not seem to be signifi cantly impaired in 
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schizophrenia (Frith, 1994); therefore any observed linguistic 
anomalies must be located not in patients’ linguistic competence 
but in their communicative competence. In this theoretical context, 
special importance is attached to the level of central processing 
in which the linguistic system has to interact with other cognitive 
systems such as ToM, memory, attention and other executive 
functions (EF) to achieve its communicative aim. 
Within the interface of the concurrent processes that 
constitute central processing, dysfunctional fi gurative language 
comprehension (FLC) in schizophrenia has been thought to be 
dependent on dysfunction in the attribution/inference of mental 
states. This article will now review studies that were interested 
in, to a greater or lesser degree, the relationship between ToM 
and LC in schizophrenia, taking into account variables related to 
intelligence and EF.
Langdon and colleagues (2002a, b) were interested in the 
relationship between ToM ability and pragmatic language 
capacity in schizophrenia. They initially (2002a) assessed a 
patient group and a control group on mentalizing tasks and 
fi gurative language comprehension (FLC). They assessed ToM 
by using the Picture Sequencing Task (Langdon & Coltheart, 
1999; Langdon et al., 2002a, b) while pragmatic capacity was 
assessed through different tasks that required the interpretation 
of fi gurative language in different stories. The group of patients 
found it diffi cult to complete the false belief tasks and also 
showed different degrees of diffi culty in understanding metaphor 
and irony in the story comprehension task. These diffi culties were 
found to be independent of verbal IQ and executive dysfunction 
in inhibiting salient information. 
In a parallel study published at a later date (2002b), Langdon 
et al. proposed establishing the degree to which diffi culties in 
attributing/inferring mental states and intentions caused pragmatic 
defi cits in comprehension and language production in patients with 
schizophrenia. To achieve this, they again assessed a patient group 
and a control group on their performance in different mentalizing 
tasks. ToM and pragmatic capacity were assessed with the same 
tools used in the previous study (Langdon et al., 2002a). The results 
of this research consistently showed that patients’ ToM and irony 
and metaphor comprehension were selectively impaired. They 
also found that defi cits in mentalizing capacity were associated 
with diffi culties in interpreting irony, but not with understanding 
metaphor. In this second work, the authors concluded that 
mentalizing anomalies may contribute to the positive aspects of 
formal thought disorder (FTD) and impaired comprehension of 
irony, while the negative characteristics of FTD and comprehension 
of metaphor are better explained by semantic anomalies. 
The two aforementioned studies led to the conclusion that ToM 
defi cits have specifi c effects on irony comprehension but not on 
metaphor comprehension, although both types of comprehension 
are impaired. For this reason, the authors suggest a possible 
dissociation between the capacities underlying the comprehension 
of metaphor and irony. Patients also show anomalies in general 
intelligence, inhibition and executive planning, but controlling 
them statistically does not eliminate the capacity of FLC defi cits 
(of both metaphor and irony) to predict whether a subject belongs 
to the patient group or not. 
Langdon and colleagues’ research into the relationship between 
mentalizing processes, language pragmatics and general cognitive 
processes have acted as incentive to several research teams. 
Two recent studies, removed from the Anglo-Saxon context, 
are reviewed below that were also interested in variables that 
coincide with the diffi culties schizophrenics have in understanding 
fi gurative language. 
Champagne-Lavau and Stip (2010) explored the extent to 
which the characteristic pragmatic defi cits (problems with FLC) 
of schizophrenia coexist alongside mentalizing defi cits and/or 
executive defi cits. They assessed a group of patients and a control 
group on three different abilities: pragmatic capacity, ToM, and 
fi nally EF. The variables were put into operation as follows: to assess 
pragmatic capacity, they used a metaphor comprehension task 
(new and crystallized) and an indirect request comprehension task 
from the Protocole Montréal d’évaluation de la Communication 
(Joanette, Ska, & Coté, 2004). ToM was assessed using a verbal 
comprehension task that included false belief stories, and EF using 
the Stroop Test (inhibition) (Golden, 1978), the Trail Making Test 
(planning) (Reitan, 1958), the WCST (cognitive fl exibility) and 
verbal fl uency using one of the tasks of the Neurosensory Center 
Comprehensive Examination for Aphasia (Spreen & Benton, 1977). 
The main results obtained by these authors clearly demonstrate 
that patients have diffi culties in pragmatic comprehension tasks 
that co-occur with executive dysfunction (lack of fl exibility) and 
ToM defi cits. Covariance analysis suggests that ToM plays a role 
in the pragmatic comprehension of language, while the latter does 
not appear to be related to cognitive fl exibility. 
Our research group (Gavilán & García-Albea, 2011) recently 
carried out a study to assess the incidence of mentalizing defi cits 
in the FLC of schizophrenic patients, while also evaluating the 
infl uence of general intelligence on the relationship we expected 
to fi nd. To do this, a group of patients and a control group were 
assessed. They both were paired in terms of age, gender, years 
of schooling, and linguistic capability. Verbal (false belief stories, 
Happé, 1994) and non-verbal tasks (Picture Sequencing Task; 
Graphic Jokes, Fletcher et al., 1995) were used to assess ToM, 
while language comprehension was evaluated in its most basic 
aspects (lexical, syntactic and semantic-pragmatic level without 
fi gurative language) and its fi gurative aspects (metaphor, irony and 
proverbs) to assess the patients’ pragmatic ability. A correlational 
analysis indicated a connection between ToM defi cits and language 
comprehension problems. A discriminant analysis determined that 
the variables that best differentiated between patients and control 
participants were those that corresponded to the critical false belief 
items in the three ToM tests, and then those that corresponded to the 
FLC tasks. The results led us to conclude that ToM impairment is 
primarily associated with the semantic-pragmatic level of language 
processing and that this relationship presents as genuine and 
independent of IQ. In other words, in patients with schizophrenia, 
mentalizing anomalies contribute negatively to understanding 
the fi gurative aspects of language, beyond impairment to general 
intelligence.
Conclusions
Widespread interest in the social dysfunction of patients with 
schizophrenia has brought a new perspective to the study of the 
cognitive functioning of this type of patient. The work of Chris 
Frith can be viewed as pioneering to the extent that he was the 
fi rst to associate mentalizing defi cits with the signs and symptoms 
experienced by people who suffer from this illness; prior to his 
proposals, research had principally focused on prototypically 
neuropsychological processes (attention, memory, executive 
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functions). Empirical research stemming from Frith’s proposals has 
highlighted that, among other things, ToM defi cit in schizophrenic 
patients is specifi c and cannot be better explained by limited 
intelligence and/or executive ability. This result is interesting 
because it means ToM can be thought of as a modularized mental 
capacity that is not limited to being an aspect of general cognitive 
ability, although it is modulated by it. Similarly, the results point 
towards a dissociation between capacities used in social and non-
social processing. It should be mentioned that the study of ToM 
in schizophrenia has provided a complementary viewpoint to the 
study of cognition in schizophrenia, and has not replaced research 
projects in which capacities such as attention, memory, inhibition 
or executive functions are considered to be of primary importance 
in explaining the social and communicative anomalies observed 
in patients. Viewed from the perspective of nearly two decades 
of study, and taking into account the large number of defi cient 
cognitive processes seen in schizophrenia, perhaps it is more 
correct to view schizophrenia as an illness caused by “multiple 
defi cits” rather than a “sole defi cit”, as Frith proposed. 
Another factor that stands out in this review is the consideration 
of mentalizing defi cits as a trait (rather than a state associated 
with exacerbation phases) of the illness that is already present, 
though in an attenuated form, in schizotypal patients, close family 
relations, and in asymptomatic patients or patients in remission. 
This would agree with theories that propose that schizophrenia is 
a neurodevelopmental disorder (very early neuronal damage that 
remains “dormant” until different developmental factors “connect” 
it) and would open the door to early detection of the illness if the 
relevant observations and tests were applied to children at critical 
ages of development. 
Language comprehension in schizophrenia has been thoroughly 
researched; however, the functional relationship between 
mentalizing capacity and language comprehension (controlling the 
contribution of intelligence and EF) has received less attention. 
This relationship appears to be decisive in understanding cognition 
in schizophrenia and, by extension, the human mind. Work by 
Langdon’s team, Champagne-Lavau and Stip’s team and that of our 
own group may be the start of a path that proves to be extremely 
fruitful in understanding how ToM, LC and general cognitive ability 
coincide. The reviewed studies have shown that ToM impairment 
is genuinely connected to diffi culties in processing the pragmatic 
aspects of language, and that connection is not primarily due to the 
impairment of general cognitive abilities such as intelligence and/
or executive functions. Therefore, it can be concluded that, to a 
certain degree, ToM is necessary, although not quite suffi cient, to 
understand the fi gurative aspects of language.
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